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Abstract
Cloud computing enables users to have access to resources on demand. This leads to
an increased number of physical machines and data centers in order to fulfill the needs of
users which are continuously on the increase. The increase in the number of active phys-
ical machines is directly proportional to the increase in the energy consumption. Thus,
minimization of energy consumption has become one of the major challenges of cloud
computing in recent years. There are many ways to power savings in data centers, but the
most effective one is the optimal placement of virtual machines on physical machines. In
this thesis, the problem of dynamic placement of virtual machines is solved in order to op-
timize the energy consumption. A cloud computing model is built along with the energy
consumption model considering the states of physical machines and the energy consump-
tion during live virtual machine migrations and the changes in the states of physical ma-
chines. The intelligent algorithms having a centralized approach, like genetic algorithm
and simulated annealing algorithm have been used to solve the dynamic virtual machine
placement problem in earlier research works but many unreachable solutions may result.
Thus, a decentralized approach based on game theoretic method is used here in order to
reach optimal solutions and also a list of executable live virtual machine migrations is
provided to reach the optimal placement. In real world scenario, physical machines may
or may not cooperate with each other to arrive at an optimal solution. Therefore, in this
thesis both cooperative as well as non-cooperative game theoretic approaches have been
used to find optimal solution to the dynamic virtual machine placement problem. It is
seen that Nash equilibrium is achieved in polynomial time. The experimental results are
compared with the results of best fit approach. Results show that energy consumption is
minimized by modifying the placement of virtual machines dynamically.
Keywords - cloud computing; dynamic virtual machine placement; game theory; Nash
equilibrium; energy consumption
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Cloud computing acts as a model to enable users to have on demand access to computing
resources with minimal management effort. It’s emergence as a favored computing model
to support large scale processing of huge volumes of data is commendable. Several multi-
national organizations such as Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, Amazon and IBM have built
cloud platforms for enterprises and users to access the cloud services.
Data Centers have been used to provide powerful computing resources for critical ar-
eas, such as nuclear physics, scientific simulation and geothermal experiments. A Data
Center (DC) usually deploys a large number of Physical Machines (PMs) packed densely
to maximize space utilization. Virtualization is one of the key concepts of data center
management. The major advantage of virtualization is the possibility of running several
operating system instances on a single PM thus utilizing the hardware capabilities more
fully which allows administrators to save money on hardware and energy costs. In liter-
ature, these individual operating system instances are defined as Virtual Machines (VM).
The computing resources of DC are made available to the users through VMs.
The VM scheduling in a cloud computing environment is very crucial as the num-
ber of users continuously increase. The VM scheduling algorithm greatly affects the
performance of the whole system and its throughput. The placement of VMs to DCs is
called Virtual Machine Placement (VMP) over DCs and the placement of VMs to PMs is
called VMP over PMs. The effectiveness of VMP is related to a Quality of Service (QoS)
as per the services. The objective of VMP will be a minimum number of data centers
with a much larger per-data center utilization. More availability and flexibility of DCs
is achieved, while the operational costs and hardware expenses such as physical space,
energy etc. are reduced.
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In this thesis, Dynamic Virtual Machine Placement over Physical machines is consid-
ered for user/broker requests. A decentralized approach is used for decision making and
the existence of Nash Equilibrium is proved.
1.1.1 Anatomy of Cloud Computing
In cloud computing, virtualization acts as a key player in providing scalable and dynamic
architectures. Along with resource sharing and scalability, virtualization provides the
ability of virtual machine migration between physical servers for load balancing (20).
Figure 1.1: Core Elements of Cloud Node
Figure 1.1 shows the important elements in a node in cloud computing environment.
Virtualization component in a node is provided by an infrastructure layer known as Hyper-
visor (also called as Virtual Machine Monitor [VMM]). This layer provides the interface
to execute multiple instances of operating system at the same time on a single PM. The
hypervisor creates objects known as Virtual Machines which encapsulate operating sys-
tem, configuration and applications. Device emulation is also provided to the physical
machine either in hypervisor or as a VM. Virtual machine management takes place both
locally in different physical machines and globally in a Data Center (DC).
The nodes represented in Figure 1.1 are then multiplied on a physical network with
management orchestration over the entire infrastructure to form a Data Center (DC) as
shown in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2: Data Center Representation
Hypervisors
Hypervisor acts as the base level of a physical machine (node). It manages the execu-
tion of the guest operating systems by providing them with a virtual operating platform.
These are known as virtual machines. The virtual machines share the virtualized hard-
ware resources of the node. The Linux Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM)is one of the best
hypervisors which is also deployed in production environments.
Device Emulation
Hypervisors provide platform where VMs can share the virtualized physical resources.
But in order to provide full virtualization, the whole node must be virtualized, which is
the job of a device emulator. An example of a complete package (emulator and hypervi-
sor) is QEMU.
Virtual Networking
Networking needs of a system intensifies as more and more VMs consolidate on physical
servers. Thus, instead of VMs communicating on the physical level, the whole network
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is also virtualized which reduces the load on the physical infrastructure. In order to op-
timally communicate between VMs, virtual switches are introduced. An example of a
virtual network provider in cloud environment is Open vSwitch.
1.1.2 Cloud Computing Architecture
In a cloud computing environment, users depend on cloud service providers to fulfill their
needs. Thus, some QoS parameters must be maintained by the cloud providers which are
cataloged in the Service Level Agreement (SLA). In order to achieve this, market oriented
architecture is needed instead of the traditional resource management architecture. Figure
1.3 showcases the cloud computing architecture which will support the market-oriented
resource allocation.
Figure 1.3: Cloud Computing Architecture
The cloud model is built using the following components.
Users or brokers which act on the behalf of users, submit their requests to the cloud
data center in order to be processed.
4
Chapter 1 : Introduction
SLA Resource Allocator provides the interface between the CSP/DC and the user/broker.
On submission of a user request, the Service Request Examiner checks the request for QoS
parameters’ requirements to make a decision whether to accept or reject the user request.
It obtains information from the VM Monitor on the availability of resources and already
available workload from the Service Request Monitor, thus ensuring that no overloading
occurs. Considering these parameters, the examiner assigns the user requests to VMs and
decides the allotted VMs’ resource requirements.
The Pricing operation makes decisions on the prices of service requests; that is whether
to charge the request on the basis of time of submission, or resource availability or sim-
ply based on fixed rates. This mechanism aids in effective prioritization of allocation of
resources in a data center.
Accounting operation is used to keep a tab on the actual resource consumption, accord-
ing to which the pricing mechanism can calculate the final cost to be charged from users.
It also helps in effective resource allocation decisions to be made by the service examiner
by using the historical resource usage information kept by the accounting mechanism.
The VM Monitor keeps a check on the resource requirements and VMs’ availabil-
ity. Dispatcher starts executing the accepted user requests on the allotted VMs. Service
Request Monitor keeps a tab on the status of the execution of the service requests.
1.2 Virtual Machine Placement in Cloud Computing
One of the major concepts in cloud computing is virtualization. It has the major advantage
that it allows the execution of several instances of the operating system on a single PM,
thus enabling complete utilization of the PM’s hardware capacities. These instances of the
operating system are called virtual machines. The placement of VMs in cloud computing
environment is very crucial since the number of cloud users is on the rise. The scheduling
of VMs greatly affects the whole system’s performance and throughput. Virtualization in
a physical machine is taken care of by Hypervisor as discussed in the previous section.
The virtual machine requests follow a two-tier distribution approach. A large number
of Physical Machines are deployed in a Data Centers. A Cloud Service Provider can have
multiple data centers. Thus the VM requests should be first distributed optimally over data
centers. The requests in each data center are then distributed over physical machines.
The virtual machine placement can be said to be two types.
5
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• Static virtual machine placement
• Dynamic virtual machine placement
1.2.1 Static Virtual Machine Placement
Static placement of VMs is done either during system startup or in offline mode. This
is the initial placement of VMs in the cloud computing environment. No prior mapping
of VMs is found. This type of VM placement does not consider either the states of the
virtual machines and physical machines, or the arrival rate of the user requests.
Below is the diagrammatic explanation of the centralized model for static virtual ma-
chine placement following the two tier approach. First, VM placement over data centers
and then the placement of requests over PMs in a particular data center are shown.
Figure 1.4 represents the flow of VM Requests from the users till they are distributed
over data centers.
Figure 1.4: Static Virtual Machine Placement over Data Centers
Cloud users use the services provided by the cloud service provider and issue requests.
These requests are in the form of virtual machine requests since every request will be
completed on a virtual machine on top of a physical machine. The VM requests comprise
the VM Requests Set. Every data center has multiple physical machines and a Data
Center Manager to control all the PMs. In order to control all the data centers, a Data
Center Controller is used.
6
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The data center controller receives the VM requests set. It then requests status infor-
mation from all the data center managers which have the information of their respective
data centers. The VM requests contain information of the resources (CPU, RAM, Net-
work etc.) needed in order to complete the request. The data center managers send
information of the available resources to the controller. The data center controller opti-
mally distributes VM requests to the data center managers following a heuristic algorithm.
This approach to distribute VM requests is a Centralized Approach, where the decision to
schedule requests depends on the central controller.
Figure 1.5 depicts the static placement of virtual machine requests in physical ma-
chines in a single data center.
Figure 1.5: Static Virtual Machine Placement over Physical Machines
In a data center, there are multiple physical machines on top of which lies the Virtual
Machine Monitor [VMM] (Hypervisor). The VMM has the responsibility for virtualiza-
tion in PMs. The data center manager sends requests to the VMMs to provide the status
information of all the physical machines. The data center manager already has the VM
requests’ information. Upon arrival of the status information from the VMMs, the DC
manager places the VM requests to the individual physical machines in order to process
them and send back the response to the cloud users. The placement of VM requests over
physical machines is also a centralized approach as the decision is taken by a central
authority, in this case the data center manager.
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1.2.2 Dynamic Virtual Machine Placement
If an existing mapping of VMs onto PMs is present, we go for dynamic placement of vir-
tual machines. The main goal of dynamic VM placement is to achieve optimum solutions
from the already present mapping of VMs at minimal cost. The optimality parameters
may vary from minimization of the response time to the minimization of energy con-
sumption or a combination of multiple parameters. The rate of arrival of user requests as
well as the states of both VMs and PMs need to be considered while taking a decision.
Below is an example of dynamic virtual machine placement.
Figure 1.6: Initial Solution i
Figure 1.7: Target Solution s1
Figure 1.6 shows the initial solution i for the dynamic VM placement problem. Seven
VMs are placed over four PMs. PM4 is in off state since no VM is running on it. As-
suming that all the PMs have same amount of resources, the VMs should be dynamically
distributed over different PMs in order to reduce energy consumption.
One such solution is shown in Figure 1.7. In order to reach solution s1 from i, live
migrations need to be performed. The list of migrations are : VM5 from PM2 to PM3,
migration of VM1 from PM1 to PM2 and finally migrate VM4 from PM2 to PM1.
Dynamic VM placement is explained in detail in chapter 2.
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1.3 Literature Survey
Cloud computing is a very emerging topic and research is being conducted for energy
efficient cloud environment. Virtual machine placement is one of the main research topics
along with optimal resource allocation in cloud computing.
Urgaonkar et al. (41) in 2004 focuses on the application placement problem in a
distributed systems environment. The aim is to maximize the number of applications
which can be hosted on the distributed platform satisfying the resource constraints. Borst
et al. (6), Ali et al. (1) and Amoura et al. (2) studied various resource management
methods in the distributed systems environment (multi-server, multi-processor, grid).
Thiruvenkadam et al. (39) worked upon server overload which is one of the main
problems in virtual machine placement. Comparison is shown between the greedy algo-
rithm, round-robin algorithm and power save algorithm which are used for virtual ma-
chine placement. A new lively based scheduling algorithm is proposed which is quicker.
Do et al. (11) focuses on application profiling for managing cloud resources efficiently. A
Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA) technique is presented which predicts application
usage depending on their past usages. This helps in efficient VM placement.
Kantarci et al. (21) propose a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) method
in order to place VMs on data centers (inter and intra placement) by virtualizing the
background topology. The main objective is to minimize power consumption accounting
CPU frequency, memory and bandwidth capabilities of the host machines. Dupont et al.
(12) use Constraint Programming (CP) technique to create a flexible and energy-aware
framework for VM placement in cloud federated DCs. The simulation proves that the
framework is energy efficient with a low computation time.
Xu et al. (46) use genetic algorithm to solve virtual machine placement problem. It
focuses on multi objectives, namely resource wastage minimization, power consumption
and cost of thermal dissipation minimization. Simulation proves that the proposed ap-
proach solves the conflicting objectives while the bin packing algorithms cannot. Chaisiri
et al. (8) propose an Optimal Virtual Machine Placement (OVMP) algorithm. The algo-
rithm considers future demand and price uncertainty while solving using Stochastic Inte-
ger Programming (SIP) to minimize the cost of hosting VMs in a multiple cloud provider
environment. The simulation results show the possibility of minimizing users’ budgets
using this algorithm.
Hyser et al. (18) address the dynamic VM placement problem which uses an existing
9
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mapping for the initial point and then new placement solutions are generated for load
balancing among hosts. Hermenier et al. (15) constructs the VM placement problem as a
constraint satisfaction problem with objectives as minimization of number of used servers
and migration costs. Khazaei et al. (23) proposed a technique for analysis based on an
approximate Markov chain model using M/G/m/m+ r queueing systems for evaluating
the performance of a cloud computation center. The author also published another work
(22) which models Cloud Computing Centers using M/G/m Queues.
In 2014, Xiao et al. (45) modeled the dynamic VM placement problem as an evolu-
tionary game theoretic problem. It cites the problems in other centralized decision mak-
ing algorithms which are being removed by the decentralized approach. One of the major
problems in centralized intelligent algorithms like genetic algorithm, is the production of
unreachable solutions from the existing mapping.
1.4 Research Motivation
Cloud computing is an emerging area which is helpful in providing energy efficient solu-
tion to distributed computing by the use of virtualization. Thus, virtual machine requests’
distribution over the hosts form an integral part of the cloud computing architecture. The
decision making process can be either centralized or decentralized, but the aim has to
be to provide energy efficient solutions. The motivation for this work can be listed as
follows.
• In order to provide energy efficient solutions, the objective is to use lesser number
of PMs for processing the user requests. But the machines should not function at
the maximum utilization. Thus, we need to find a solution which minimizes the
number of PMs used with lesser utilization such that it is energy efficient.
• The centralized decision making process takes more time and is less energy efficient
than the decentralized process. Thus game theoretic methods should be used in
order to provide optimal solution to the VM placement problem, thus achieving
Nash equilibrium.
• All the evolutionary algorithms like the genetic algorithm, simulated annealing al-
gorithm do not provide the migrations needed to reach the optimal solution to the
10
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dynamic VM placement problem, thus unreachable solutions are not taken care of
(45).
1.5 Problem Statement
The dynamic virtual machine placement problem has been solved by many researchers.
But they haven’t considered the live migrations and thus may provide unreachable solu-
tions to the problem. The primary objective of this research is to model a cloud computing
framework such that the dynamic virtual placement problem can be solved while provid-
ing the live VM migrations to be executed in order to reach the solution.
This can be elaborated as follows :
• The motive is to model the dynamic placement problem in such a way that the states
of virtual machines and physical machines are taken into account. Also the list of
executable live VM migrations must be provided so that the optimal solution can
be obtained.
• The problem if solved using centralized evolutionary techniques has a risk of pro-
viding unreachable solutions. Thus, decentralized approach using congestion game
model must be used in order to provide the solutions to the dynamic virtual machine
placement problem.
• In real world scenario, physical machines may act selfishly and do not cooperate
to achieve an optimal solution to the problem. Thus both cooperative and non-
cooperative approaches should be discussed in order to reach to an optimal solution.
The solution to the dynamic VM placement problem is to achieved taking into con-
sideration the following constraints :
• Capacity Constraint - This condition ensures that the total resource requirements
of all the VMs running on a specific PM should be less than or equal to the total
resource availability of that particular PM.
• Placement Constraint - This constraint checks the criteria that a virtual machine
should run on only a single physical machine.
• SLA Constraint - The cloud model to be incorporated in the real world should follow
QoS parameters. Thus the service level agreement constraint keeps a tab on the
11
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QoS parameters enlisted in the agreement and ensures that they are not violated
when providing the optimal solution.
1.6 Research Contribution
The major contributions of this thesis can be written as:
• An energy consumption model is built to calculate the total energy consumption by
physical machines, keeping in mind many factors. Then a decentralized approach
is taken using cooperative game theory to optimally place virtual machines onto
physical machines dynamically so as to minimize the energy consumption.
• During the decentralized decision making process, it may so happen that the phys-
ical machines act in a selfish manner and do not cooperate with each other to arrive
at an optimal solution. Thus in this work, non-cooperative game theoretic approach
is also proposed to provide optimal solution to the dynamic virtual machine place-
ment problem.
1.7 Organization of Thesis
In this chapter, a summarized idea of cloud computing and virtual machine placement is
given along with the literature survey. We even discuss the motivation and the problem
statement. The remainder of the thesis has the following organization:
Chapter 2: A brief concept of dynamic VM placement problem and a literature survey
of the existing research in dynamic VM placement problem are mentioned in this chapter.
Chapter 3: In this chapter, we have shown the solution to the dynamic VM placement
problem in a cooperative game theoretic approach.
Chapter 4: This chapter provides a non-cooperative game theoretic approach in order
to reach an optimal solution to the dynamic VM placement problem.
Chapter 5: We draw the conclusion of our research work and also give some points
for the future work in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
2.1 Introduction
VM placement problem can be distinguished into two kinds - static VM placement and
dynamic VM placement. The cases during which static placement of VMs is considered
are during system startup, or creation of new VMs which are to be placed onto PMs with-
out any movement of existing VMs, or when VMs are shut down. Static placement is
normally used during initial stages in offline mode, which may not be altered for pro-
longed time periods. But static VM placement does not consider the states of VMs and
PMs; also the rate of arrival for user requests is not dealt with.
Dynamic placement of VMs modifies the mapping of VMs onto PMs dynamically at
regular time intervals in order to provide optimal performance of the machines and not
violating the Service Level Agreement (SLA). In this chapter, dynamic VM placement
problem has been explained and then a detailed literature survey is given about the pre-
vious solutions to the VM placement problem. Also an energy consumption model is
built which takes into consideration three sections of energy consumption, namely energy
consumption of physical machines during different states, consumption of energy during
state transitions and energy usage during live VM migrations.
2.2 Dynamic VM Placement in Cloud Computing
Dynamic placement of VMs places VMs based on an existing mapping which is in con-
trast to the static placement of VMs which starts with no mapping. Dynamic VM place-
ment aims to reach optimal solutions from the existing mapping at minimum cost. This
would not shut down or stop the already running VMs, thus the placement solution should
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provide the list of live migrations to be executed in order to reach the optimal state from
the existing state. The whole process is in contrast to the static placement of VMs where
VMs can be stopped and restarted which increases the energy consumption and thus de-
grades the complete system performance. In order to execute dynamic placement of VMs,
states of physical machines should also be considered.
Figure 2.1: Initial Solution i
Figure 2.2: Target Solution s1
Figure 2.3: Target Solution s2
Dynamic VM Placement problem can be illustrated in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. Figure
2.1 shows the initial solution i for the dynamic VM placement problem. Distribution
of seven VMs over four PMs is shown. PM4 is in off state since no VM is running
on it. Assuming that all the PMs have same amount of resources, the VMs should be
dynamically distributed over different PMs in order to reduce energy consumption. One
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such solution is shown in Figure 2.2. In order to reach solution s1 from i, live migrations
need to be performed. The list of migrations are : VM5 from PM2 to PM3, migration
of VM1 from PM1 to PM2 and finally migrate VM4 from PM2 to PM1. We can reach
another solution s2 from i as shown in Figure 2.3. Since there isn’t much space in PM1
and PM2 for the direct interchange of VM1 and VM3, there needs to be an involvement
of PM3. Thus the migrations needed for solution s2 to be reached are : the extra migration
of VM3 from PM2 to PM3, VM1’s migration from PM1 to PM2 and migrating VM3
from PM3 to PM1. But in order to reach s2 from i will result in more cost than to reach
solution s1 from initial placement i because of the migrations involving larger VMs. VM1
and VM3 could have been stopped and restarted in order to facilitate direct interchange
but that would involve more cost. Also the involvement of PM4 for the interchange of
VM1 and VM3 would result in higher costs since it would then consider the cost of state
change for PM4.
2.3 Related Work
There is existing research concerned with finding solutions to the dynamic VM placement
problem.
Hyser et al. (18) in 2007 studied the virtual machine placement scenario by developing
an autonomic controller which dynamically maps the virtual machines onto the physical
machines by following the users’ policies. This work also differentiated the static VM
placement and dynamic VM placement. The algorithms dealing with static VM placement
start with a clean slate, that is no initial mapping. For example, loading goods from
warehouse onto empty trucks. There isn’t any need for these algorithms to consider the
intermediate steps or the number of moves taken to reach the final state. This is in sharp
contrast to the algorithms dealing with dynamic VM placement problem which must find
optimal solutions from an initial mapping not a clean slate. In continuation with the
same example as above, all the items are already loaded in the trucks. There isn’t any
warehouse. An optimal solution has to found with all executable migrations of items
from one truck to another without violating any constraints.
In 2007, Wood et al. (43) presented a system called Sandpiper, which was was used for
automatic monitoring and detection of system hotspots. It also provided a new mapping
of VMs onto physical hosts and initiated the migrations too. Algorithms for hotspot
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detection focuses on signaling a need for migration of VMs whenever SLA violations are
detected either implicitly or explicitly. In the same year, Bobroff et al. (5) implemented
an algorithm based on first-fit approximation to find solution to the problem of dynamic
VM placement having the goal of price minimization. The problem was mapped as a
bin packing one where the minimum number of PMs to be needed for the VMs was
calculated and then a remapping was done for VMs onto PMs. The main disadvantage of
the algorithm was that, it didn’t look for unreachable solutions from the initial mapping.
A two phase process was developed by Hermenier et al. (16) in 2009 in order to
find solutions to the dynamic VM placement problem. The consolidation manager named
Entropy found solutions in two phases. The first phase finds out a placement keeping
in mind the constraints, VM set and the CPU requirements. It also provides the likable
configuration plan to achieve the desired mapping. The second phase tries to improve the
result computed in the first phase. It takes into account a refined set of constraints and
tries to minimize the number of migrations required. However very simple parameters are
considered in this work and also server consolidation is not taken as a factor.
Liao et al. (28) in 2012 affirmed that dynamic VM placement problem faced three ma-
jor challenges; multi-dimensional constraints, the initial state and the intermediary steps.
They proposed a system called GreenMap which was a VM-based management frame-
work to be able to execute live VM migrations considering the resource consumption
of servers and energy consumption. Simulated annealing based heuristic is used for the
optimization problem under the constraint of multi-dimensional resource consumption.
The two objectives namely, reduction in energy consumption and performance degrada-
tion are balanced to give the desired output. But the GreenMap system doesn’t address
heterogeneous physical hosts which invariably form the real life server clusters.
2.4 Problem Formulation
There are P Physical Machines (PMs). Every PM has a state associated with it. The states
included are : 1 = off, 2 = idle, 3 = ready and 4 = running. Thus we use an array PMS (1
X P) to specify the current state of a PM. For every PM, there are R different resources.
Thus we use an array PMR (R X P) to specify the amount of resources that every PM
has. Thus PMRij specifies the amount of resourcei that PMj has.
If there are V number of Virtual Machines (VMs), then an array VMR (R X V) is
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created in order to forecast requirement of resources for VMs for a certain period of time.
Thus VMRij indicates the requirement of ith resource by the jth VM. For all the V VMs,
we require I number of performance indicators. In order to represent the performance
requirements, we create an array VMP (I X V), where VMPij is the requirement of the
ith performance indicator for the jth VM.
The result of the virtual machine placement problem is stored in a mapping array M
(P X V). Mij can hold values 0 or 1. The value 1 indicates that jth VM is placed at the ith
PM, while the value 0 shows that jth VM is not running on the ith PM. We also require an
array MP (I X V) which indicates the level of performance of all the VMs. MPij means
the jth VM is performing at the ith level for a particular solution to the VM placement
problem.
The VM placement problem aims to optimize the targeted features of the system by
satisfying all the constraints. Performance optimization and cost optimization are the
essential objectives of the dynamic VM placement problem. Performance optimization
comes at an increased cost; thus most users do not aim for optimal performance as long
as Service Level Agreement (SLA) is met. The SLA can be modeled as constraints which
reduces the dynamic VM placement problem as a single objective problem focusing on
cost optimization. Since reduction in energy consumption is the main part of the cost, we
use it as the optimization objective.
The VM dynamic placement problem based on energy consumption (EC) (VDPPEC)
can be formulated as follows:
V DPPEC = min EC(M) (2.4.1)
such that,
Cri ≤ PMRri
(Cri = VMR × M ′ ; r = 1, 2, . . . ., R ; i = 1, 2, . . . ., P )
(2.4.2)
P∑
i=1
Mij = 1 (j = 1, 2, . . . . ., V ) (2.4.3)
MPiv ≥ VMPiv (i = 1, 2, . . . . , I; v = 1, 2, . . . .. , V ) (2.4.4)
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Equation 2.4.1 shows the optimization objective of the VM dynamic placement prob-
lem, i.e. minimization of energy consumption (EC) for a particular placement solution
(M).
The solution is arrived upon satisfying all the three constraints as shown in equations
2.4.2, 2.4.3 and 2.4.4. Equation 2.4.2 is the capacity constraint which checks the condi-
tion where the total resource requirements of the VMs running on a particular PM should
be lesser than or equal to the total available resources of the specific PM. M ′ is the trans-
position of the mapping matrix (M). Placement constraint is represented in Equation 2.4.3
which states that a VM should run on only one PM. Equation 2.4.4 shows that the SLA
should be met in VM placement solution.
2.4.1 Energy Consumption Model
The major part of energy consumption in a data center is produced by PMs which are
running. There are other causes of energy consumption such as cooling apparatus but
they form a much lesser percentage. Here we focus on the energy consumption or PMs
which is divided into three sections.
Energy consumption in different states
Existing research indicates that energy consumption can be minimized by the adjustment
of the states of PMs. Here 4 states of a PM are considered.
• off - This state consumes no energy.
• ready - PM is on but there are no active VMs on it. This state wastes energy con-
sumption if PM is kept in this state for a long time. But if PM is switched off, much
energy and time will be wasted to turn the PM back on to ready state.
• idle - This state exists as a result of a trade-off between off and ready states. PMs
in this state consumes lesser energy than PMs in ready state. Also lesser time and
energy will be required to turn a PM on from idle state to ready state.
• running - This state consumes the maximum energy.
The states and the transitions allowed are shown in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: States and their transitions
It is observed that energy consumption varies according to load changes in a PM (46).
Thus energy consumption of a PM depends on the PM’s utilization. Thus the energy
consumption for a PM can be modeled as:
EC(t) = FE × t + x × L(t)y (2.4.5)
In equation 2.4.5, EC(t) represents the energy consumed in time period t, FE is the
energy consumption that is fixed per unit time, L(t) is the load of PM in time t, and x and
y are the energy adjusting coefficients.
The above equation can be modified for modeling energy consumption of the ith PM
in a particular state, since the fixed energy consumption of a PM in every state is different.
ECi(t) = FEi(PMSi) × t + xi × Li(t)yi (2.4.6)
Equation 2.4.6 calculates the energy consumption of PMi in time period t. FEi(PMSi)
is the fixed energy consumption per unit time of PMi in state PMSi. Li(t) is the load
of PMi for time period t, while xi is the energy coefficient of the ith PM and yi is the
relationship between load and energy of PMi.
Energy consumption during state switch
Following rules are maintained while calculating energy consumption during switching
of states of a PM.
• Energy consumption during switching between running and ready states can be
ignored.
• State switching between off and ready states is slower than switches between idle
and ready states.
• Switching off a PM costs lesser than keeping the PM in idle state.
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Thus we use an array ECS (P X 4) to store the energy consumption of state switches
since it is fixed for a particular state transition for a specific PM. The energy consumption
during state switching of PMi according to the array ECS can be seen in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Energy consumption of state switching
Energy consumption during live VM migrations
The consumption of energy during live virtual machine migrations are of three parts;
• Energy consumption by the source PM for preparation for migration.
• Energy consumption by the target PM for reception and rebuilding of the migrated
VM.
• Energy consumption by other physical equipment during VM migration.
We maintain three arrays in order for energy consumption during live VM migration.
EV S (P X V) denotes the energy consumption by source PM during migration.
EV Sij is the energy consumed by PMi for moving VMj out.
EV T (P X V) denotes the energy consumption by target PMs for receiving the mi-
grated VMs. Thus, EV Tij is the energy consumed by PMi for receiving the migrated
VMj .
EVX (P X P X V) is a three dimensional array which denotes the energy consumption
during migration. Thus EVXijk is the energy consumed during migration of VMk from
PMi to PMj .
Thus the energy consumption during live VM migrations can be modeled as follows:
EV Sij = αi × SZj + βi (2.4.7)
EV Tkj = αk × SZj + βk (2.4.8)
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EVXkj = γik × SZj (2.4.9)
where, αi, βi, αk, βk and γik are energy adjusting coefficients and SZj is the size of VMj .
The overall energy consumption model
The energy consumption due to the switching of states during the entire migration process
can be simplified. On comparison of the array PMS before and after the whole migration
process, an array PMST (4 X P) can be derived, which represents the state switching of
all PMs. Thus,
• PMST1j = 1 means PMj need state transition from off to ready.
• PMST2j = 1 means PMj need state transition from idle to ready.
• PMST3j = 1 means PMj need state transition from ready to idle.
• PMST4j = 1 means PMj need state transition from idle to off.
Thus the total energy consumption by state switching of PMs (EPS) for a particular
solution (M) of the VM placement problem can be calculated as:
EPS(M) =
P∑
i=1
4∑
k=1
(ECSik × PMSTki) (2.4.10)
In order to calculate the total energy consumption during live migration, we create 3
arrays by comparing the array M before and after migration. Array VMLM (P X P X
V) is created to show the live migrations for all the VMs. Thus, VMLMikj = 1 means
that VM ′js migration from PMi to PMk is needed. Similarly 2 other arrays VMS (P
X V) and VMT (P X V) are created to show the sources of migrations and their targets
respectively. Thus VMSij = 1 means that VMj is migrated from PMi and VMTkj = 1
means that VMj is migrated to PMk.
Thus the total energy consumption during migration of VMs (EVM) for a particular
solution (M) can be calculated as:
EVM(M) =
P∑
i=1
V∑
j=1
(EV Sij × VMSij)+
P∑
k=1
V∑
j=1
(EV Tkj × VMTkj)
+
P∑
i=1
P∑
k=1
V∑
j=1
(EVXikj × VMLMikj)
(2.4.11)
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The total energy consumption by all the PMs in different states (EPM) for a particular
solution (M) can be given as:
EPM(M) =
P∑
i=1
ECi(t) (2.4.12)
Thus the total energy consumption by the VM placement problem (TEC) from initial
solution M ′ to solution M can be denoted as:
TEC(M) = EPS(M) + EVM(M) + EPM(M) − EPM(M ′) (2.4.13)
where, EPM(M ′) is the energy consumption of all PMs under initial solution M ′.
2.4.2 Solution to Dynamic VM Placement Problem
Dynamic virtual machine placement problem is NP-hard. There has been existing re-
search where attempts have been made to map the dynamic VM placement problem to
bin-packing problem which led to the development of evolutionary algorithms like, ge-
netic algorithms or particle swarm optimization algorithm. As explained in Section 2.2,
many problems arise when VMs have to be placed dynamically. While the evolutionary
algorithms like genetic algorithms tries to provide optimal solutions to the problem, there
may be solutions which are unreachable.
Figure 2.6: Unreachable Solution
Figure 2.6 shows an example of unreachable solution to the dynamic VM placement
problem. Figure 2.6(a) shows the placement of 4 VMs onto 2 PMs which form the initial
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solution sol0. The optimal solution sol is shown in Figure 2.6(b) which brings down
the energy consumption by a considerable amount. But the solution is unreachable since
there is no executable migration route from (a) to (b). In order to achieve the solution, a
third PM has to be switched on to handle the migrations which will again consume more
energy. Thus, in case of evolutionary algorithms, judgment has to be made whether the
optimal solution is reachable or not.
In this thesis, decentralized decision making is used with the help of congestion game
theory in order to find solutions to the dynamic VM placement problem. In Congestion
Games, a group of players is modeled to share a resource set. Every player selects a
subset of resources from the resource set in order to maximize the payoff (32). Here, PMs
will be modeled as players which will select a subset of VMs from the VM set in order to
minimize the consumption of energy. Nash Equilibrium is attained after a finite number
of iterations. This intelligent algorithm uses the initial mapping to obtain the optimum
solution and also generates the list of executable VM live migrations to reach the optimal
state. Thus no solution is unreachable.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the dynamic virtual machine placement problem has been discussed in
detail. Also, the already existing work concerned with finding solutions to the dynamic
VM placement problem is discussed. The problem statement is formulated along with the
discussion that the problem will be solved in this thesis in a decentralized manner with
the help of congestion game theory. The next chapter focuses on finding solutions to the
dynamic VM placement problem in cooperative game theoretic manner.
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COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY FOR DYNAMIC VM
PLACEMENT
3.1 Introduction
Minimization of power consumption in data centers has become one of the major prob-
lems in recent times. It has been observed that one of the most effective ways to save
power consumption is to optimize the VM placement dynamically in a virtualized data
center.
Decentralized approach is used for the dynamic placement of VMs over PMs in order
to optimize the energy consumption. A novel algorithm based on congestion game theory
has been proposed to solve the VM placement problem. It is proved that the algorithm
reaches Nash Equilibrium in polynomial time. Also the algorithm can take an initial
mapping as input and produce a list of live VM migrations as an output. It is considered
in this chapter that all the physical machines cooperate with one another to achieve the
optimal solution; thus cooperative game is used among physical machines.
3.2 Game Theory
Turocy et al. (40) defines game theory as the formal study of cooperation and conflict.
Hotz (17) describes a game as a set of players and their possibilities to play the game by
following some rules (strategies). The players can be individuals, agents or organizations.
The main subject of game theory are the situations where the result is mattered not only
by the decision of a single player but others as well.
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The earliest instance of formal game theoretic analysis is Antoine Cournot’s study
of duopoly in 1838. In 1921, a formal theory of games was suggested by Emile Borel.
This was further studied upon by John von Neumann’s theory of parlor games in 1928.
The basic terminology and setup of game theory was established in Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944. John Nash in 1950
showed that the games with finite number of players always have a point of equilibrium
where the players choose their best strategy taking into consideration the strategies of
other players. This equilibrium is known as Nash Equilibrium named after John Nash.
This pivotal point in non cooperative game theory has been used in various fields from
sociology, biology to computer science.
3.2.1 Types of Game Scenarios
There are mainly two types of game scenarios:
• Cooperative Game
• Non-Cooperative Game
Cooperative Game
Xhafa et al. (44) defines cooperative game as the game scenario where players form
coalitions in advance to discuss their actions. Cooperative game theory investigates such
coalition games by studying how successfully a coalition divides its proceeds (40).
The applications of cooperative game theory is mainly seen in cases related to political
science or international relations. In cloud computing, cooperative game theory is used
when data centers are managed by a single service provider or the providers form a coali-
tion such that the strategies of virtual machine placement are known by all the physical
machines and respective actions are taken to maximize the payoffs of all the SPs.
Non-Cooperative Game
The term non-cooperative implies that this type of game models the process of players
who are making choices thinking about their own interest.
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The non cooperative game theory relates to realistic cloud computing where the ser-
vice providers do not form coalitions and a decision is made considering the selfish actions
of individual providers who want to maximize their profit.
3.2.2 Games in Normal Form
The representation of a game in normal form or strategic form is (19):
• The set of players N = {1 . . . . . n}.
• Player i has a set of actions ai which are normally referred to as pure strategies.
• The set of all pure strategies is denoted by a = (a1 . . . . . an).
• Player i has a payoff represented as the function of the action vectors is denoted by
ui : A → IR where ui(a) is i’s payoff if a is the strategy taken.
Normal form games are often represented in the form of a table. The most common
example is prisoner’s dilemma represented in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: A prisoner’s Dilemma Game
In prisoner’s dilemma, the number of players is two with each having two pure strate-
gies, where ai = {C,D}; C is for cooperate and D is for defect. C indicates the payoff
to the row player (player 1) as a function of the pair of actions, while D is the payoff to
the column player (player 2). The game is explained as follows. Both the players are
caught committing a crime and are investigated in different cells in a police station. The
prosecutor comes to each of them and tells each of them:
If you provide a confession and accept to testify against the other; and if the partner
doesn’t confess; you will be set free. If both of you accept committing the crime, you will
both be sent to jail for two years. If you do not accept committing the crime but your
partner does, you will be given a sentence of three years imprisonment. If none of you
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confess; only one year punishment will be given due to the lack of evidence.
So the payoff matrix shows the imprisonment time in years. The term cooperate means
that the partners cooperate with each other. The term defect means that you are accepting
the crime and agreeing to testify, and so you are breaking the agreement which you two
have.
3.2.3 Nash Equilibrium
If a set of strategies for the players constitute a Nash Equilibrium, it means that none of
the players can benefit by altering his/her strategy unilaterally.
A strategy ai is a best reply, also known as a best response, of player i to a set of
strategies a−i ∈ a−i for the other players if
ui(ai, a−i) ≥ ui(a′i, a−i) ; ∀ a′i (3.2.1)
A profile of strategies a ∈ A is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if ai is a best reply to ai
for each i. That is, a is a Nash equilibrium if
ui(ai, a−i) ≥ ui(a′i, a−i) ; ∀ i, a′i (3.2.2)
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only states that the action taken by each agent be the
best against the actual equilibrium actions taken by the other players, and not necessarily
against all possible actions of the other players.
In prisoner’s dilemma, Nash Equilibrium occurs if both player 1 and 2 cooperate (C).
If any of the players change his/her strategy, no player can benefit.
3.3 Literature Survey for Cooperative Game Theory
The process flow in centralized cloud computing is shown in Figure 3.2. Users on ac-
cessing services provided by the cloud service providers, send requests to the request
manager. The request manager has information of the details of every request. These de-
tails are given to the data center controller which has information of all the DCs provided
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by the individual DC managers. The DC controller takes a centralized decision with re-
spect to both the information (request details and data center details) and then sends the
request to a particular data center manager. Data center manager thus has the details of
the request queue sent to that particular data center by data center controller. It fetches
the information of all the PMs present in the data center from the Hypervisor (Virtual
Machine Monitor). A centralized decision is taken by the data center manager and the
requests are sent to hypervisors which process the requests in virtual machines thus im-
plementing virtualization. The request is processed and response is given back to the user
by the response manager. This explains the two tier central decision making in cloud
computing.
Figure 3.2: Centralized Decision Making in Cloud Computing
In decentralized decision making, the two tier decision making process is taken by the
players. In the first tier, decision to distribute requests over data centers are taken by all
the data center managers which act as players. Next the players are the physical machine
which take the decision to optimally place virtual machines. The players may or may not
cooperate with each other in order to make a decision. In this thesis, the decentralized
decision making is implemented using game theory. Various works have already been
done in the field of cooperative game theory in cloud computing.
Wei et al. (42) uses cooperative game theory in order to find solution of the QOS
constrained problem of allocation of resources. Here problem solution is done in 2 steps.
First optimal problem solution is done by every participant independently without re-
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source multiplexing. Next a mechanism is designed by considering strategies which are
multiplexed, of all the players. Existence of Nash Equilibrium is shown if resource allo-
cation problem has feasible solutions. This paper creates a useful analytical tool for the
solution of optimal scheduling problem.
No consideration for multi-tier architecture of web services and lack of emphasis on
stable placement of applications are the drawbacks in (42). These disadvantages are re-
moved by Lee et al. (27) where an evolutionary approach of game theory is designed
for stable and adaptive placement of applications. This paper implements Nuage which
uses an evolutionary game theoretic approach in order for stable adaptive deployment of
applications. The main goal of this work is to N applications on M hosts with the goal
that applications adapt their locations and allocation of resources is done on the basis
of resource and workload availability. In this work only CPU time share is considered
for assignment of resources to each VM. Resources such as memory space and network
bandwidth should also be considered for allocation of resources. Also there isn’t any
comparison of the evolutionary game theory with existing optimization algorithms.
General colocation game and process colocation game were introduced by London˜o et
al. in (29) in order to distribute resources to infrastructure providers. This work considers
a cooperative game theoretic framework where the objectives for resource management
were to maximize resource utilization and minimize total cost of the allocated resources.
The work also proves that achieving nash equilibrium is NP-complete. The main draw-
backs of this this work are though it provides best response computation, it is an expen-
sive framework. Also it does not consider P2P systems to optimize resource management
without the need for central authority.
Cooperative VM management for multi-organization environment in cloud computing
was done by Niyato et al. (34). Three types of resources are considered for VM manage-
ment; private cloud, on-demand plans and reservation of public CSP. The algorithm works
in two steps. First an optimization model is formulated for cooperative organizations and
optimal VM allocation problem is solved in order to minimize the total cost. Then net-
work game is used to analyze the cooperative framework. This work doesn’t consider the
stochastic nature of demand.
Resource allocation in Horizontal Dynamic Cloud Federation Platform (HDCF) envi-
ronment is studied by Hassan et al. (14). The work presents a cost effective and scalable
solution to the resource allocation problem using game theory. It studies both cooperative
and non-cooperative resource allocation games as well as both decentralized and central-
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ized algorithms are presented in order to find optimal solutions. The major drawback
in this framework is that it doesn’t take into consideration the dynamic nature of clouds
where hundreds of clouds leave and join the federation in a dynamic manner.
Mao et al. (31) worked upon the problem of cloud service deployment by modeling it
as a congestion game. Only cost and quality of resources were considered. Every service
acts as a player which chooses a subset of resources for the maximization of his payoff. It
is shown that Nash equilibrium is reached in polynomial time. This work can be further
implemented in seeking solution to the placement of multiple cooperative heterogeneous
components over many cloud services.
New resource allocation game models (CT-RAG, CS-RAG) were introduced for prob-
lem solving in cloud computing by Sun et al. (37). Existence of Nash equilibrium is
shown but the work considers static game with no representation of fairness of tasks. The
problem of allocation of resources for PMs in cloud computing based on the uncertainty
principle of game theory and coalition formulation was studied by Pillai et al. (35). It is
shown that the solution gives higher request satisfaction and better resource utilization.
3.4 Observations
Table 3.1: Cooperative Game Theory in Distributed Resource Management
Researcher Game Environment Work
2009
Wei et al. (42) Cooperative Cloud Solves QOS constraint resource problem
by two step method and shows the exis-
tence of Nash equilibrium for an alloca-
tion game feasible solutions.
Londono et al.
(29)
Cooperative Cloud Introduces both General Colocation
Game (GCG) and Process Colocation
Game (PCG) for the solution to re-
source management problem in cloud
computing.
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2010
Lee et al. (27) Cooperative Cloud Game theoretic approach to stable and
adaptive application placement in cloud
environment considering multi-tier archi-
tecture. The work considers only CPU
time share for application deployment.
Xhafa et al.
(44)
Grid Presents a survey of the game theoretic
models used for allocation of resources in
grid systems and their solution using meta
heuristic models.
2011
Niyato et al.
(34)
Cooperative Cloud Formulates model for optimal virtual ma-
chine allocation in cooperative organiza-
tions to minimize the total cost. The
stochastic nature of demand is not consid-
ered.
Niyato et al.
(33)
Cooperative Cloud Studies the cooperative behaviors of mul-
tiple cloud providers to present a hierar-
chical model of cooperative game. So-
lution is obtained using stochastic linear
programming game model.
Hassan et al.
(14)
Cooperative
and Non-
cooperative
Cloud Studies both cooperative and non-
cooperative games for the allocation
problem of resources in HDCF plat-
form presenting both centralized and
decentralized algorithms.
2012
Ge et al. (13) Mobile Cloud Formulates the congestion game model in
order to find the solution to the energy
minimization problem in mobile cloud
computing. Existence of Nash Equilib-
rium is proved.
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Lu et al. (30) Cooperative Cloud Cooperative sharing of the resource and
revenue in a cloud federation environment
is considered from the game theoretic per-
spective. Cloud providers form coalition
in order to increase profit and resource
utilization.
2013
Mao et al.
(31)
Cooperative Cloud The cloud service deployment problem is
modeled as a congestion game with price
and quality as the performance objectives.
Each service is treated as a player which
selects a subset of resources to maximize
payoff.
2014
Sun et al. (37) Cooperative Cloud Group participation game strategy is pro-
posed for resource allocation problem.
Two game models namely CT-RAG and
CS-Rag are discussed. This work consid-
ers only static game with CPU as the sole
resource.
Pillai et al.
(35)
Cooperative Cloud Solution to resource allocation problem is
obtained based on formation of coalition
among agents and the uncertainty princi-
ple of game theory. This results in better
utilization of resources.
3.5 System Model
With increasing dependence on Cloud Service Providers (CSP) by consumers for comput-
ing needs, there has been an enhanced requirement of a specific level of QoS which has
to be followed by the CSPs. CSPs aim to meet the QoS parameters which are specified
in the negotiated Service Level Agreement (SLA). Thus, an improved cloud architecture
32
Chapter 3 : Cooperative Game Theory for Dynamic VM Placement
has to be developed which will cater to the needs of the consumers as well as the CSPs.
The problem model that has been used in this chapter is depicted in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Proposed System Model
The cloud architecture being referred here has many entities. Users or brokers which
act on the behalf of users, submit their requests to the cloud data center. SLA Resource
Allocator provides the platform between the CSP/DC and the user/broker. On submission
of a user request, the Service Request Examiner checks the request for QoS requirements’
parameters to decide whether or not to accept the user request. It makes sure that no
overloading occurs by keeping a tab on the availability of resources obtained from the VM
Monitor and already available system resource usage from the Service Request Monitor.
Keeping these in mind, the examiner assigns the user requests to VMs and decide the
requirements of resources for the allotted VMs.
VM requirements are given in the form of a vector x.(−→cpu) + y.(−−−→mem) + z.(−−−→cores),
where −→cpu is the CPU requirement in GHz, −−−→mem is the memory requirement in GB and
−−−→cores is the requirement for the number of cores. x, y and z are the multiplying factors
constraint to x+ y + z = 1
The VM Monitor keeps a check on the VMs’ availability and resource requirements.
Dispatcher begins executing the accepted user requests on the allotted VMs. Service
Request Monitor keeps a check on the progress of the execution of the service requests.
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All Physical Machines (PMs) have a PM Controller which accepts the VM Request
queue sent from the dispatcher. The PM Controllers are as players for the cooperative
game theory which take the decision on the dynamic VM placement problem in order to
minimize energy consumption.
3.6 Problem Statement
Figure 3.3 refers to the system model which is used in order to find the solution to dynamic
VM placement problem.
There are n Physical Machines (PMs). Every PM has a state associated with it. The
states included are : 1 = off, 2 = idle, 3 = ready and 4 = running. Thus we use an array
PMS (1 X P) to specify the current state of a PM. For every PM, there are 3 resources,
namely CPU (GHz), Memory (GB) and number of cores. Thus we use an array PMR
(3 X n) to specify the amount of resources that every PM has. Thus PMRij specifies the
amount of resourcei that PMj has. The dynamic VM placement problem in this chapter
is solved by Cooperative Game Theory where the players are the physical machines. Thus
the resource status information is shared by all the PMs which aids in the problem solving
process.
There are Vi number of VMs in PMi. Let the maximum number of VMs present in
one particular PM be maxV .
maxV = max(Vi) ; 1 ≤ i ≤ n (3.6.1)
VM requirements are given in the form of a vector x.(−→cpu) + y.(−−−→mem) + z.(−−−→cores),
where −→cpu is the CPU requirement in GHz, −−−→mem is the memory requirement in GB and
−−−→cores is the requirement for the number of cores. x, y and z are the multiplying factors
constraint to x+ y + z = 1.
Thus a 3-dimensional array VMR (3 X maxV X n) is created in order to forecast
requirement of resources for VMs for a certain period of time. Thus VMRijk indicates
the requirement of ith resource by the jth VM residing in kth PM. For all the V VMs
where V =
n∑
i=1
Vi, we require I number of performance indicators. In order to represent
the performance requirements, we create an array VMP (I X V), where VMPij is the
requirement of the ith performance indicator for the jth VM. This performance indicator
34
Chapter 3 : Cooperative Game Theory for Dynamic VM Placement
acts as the SLA indicator.
The result of the virtual machine placement problem is stored in a mapping array M
(P X V). Mij can hold values 0 or 1. The value 1 indicates that jth VM is placed at the ith
PM, while the value 0 shows that jth VM is not running on the ith PM. We also require an
array MP (I X V) which indicates the level of performance of all the VMs. MPij means
the jth VM is performing at the ith level for a particular solution to the VM placement
problem.
The VM dynamic placement problem based on energy consumption (EC) (VDPPEC)
can be formulated as follows:
V DPPEC = min TEC(M) (3.6.2)
where,
TEC(M) = EPS(M) + EVM(M) + EPM(M) (3.6.3)
such that,
Cri ≤ PMRri
(Cri = VMR × M ′ ; r = 1, 2, . . . ., R ; i = 1, 2, . . . ., P )
(3.6.4)
P∑
i=1
Mij = 1 (j = 1, 2, . . . . ., V ) (3.6.5)
MPiv ≥ VMPiv (i = 1, 2, . . . . , I; v = 1, 2, . . . .. , V ) (3.6.6)
Equation 3.6.2 shows the optimization objective of the VM dynamic placement prob-
lem, i.e. minimization of energy consumption (EC) for a particular placement solution
(M).
The solution is arrived upon satisfying all the three constraints as shown in equations
3.6.4, 3.6.5 and 3.6.6. Equation 3.6.4 is the capacity constraint which checks the condi-
tion where the total resource requirements of the VMs running on a particular PM should
be less than or equal to the total available resources of the specific PM. M ′ is the transpo-
sition of the mapping matrix (M). Placement constraint is represented in Equation 3.6.5
which states that a VM should run on only one PM. Equation 3.6.6 shows that the SLA
should be met in VM placement solution.
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3.7 Optimization Algorithm for VDPPEC
In this section, the algorithm based on congestion game theory for cooperative physical
machines has been discussed which is used for solving the dynamic VM placement prob-
lem. In order for better convenience for description of the algorithm, the symbols along
with their meanings have been listed in Table 3.2.
The algorithm is executed dynamically whenever any SLA constraint is violated. The
status of all the physical machines is shared by all the players. Thus, it is cooperative
game theory.
Table 3.2: List of symbols and their meanings
Symbols Meanings
n Number of physical machines
V Number of virtual machines
ρn Initial mapping of V VMs onto n PMs
δn Optimal mapping of V VMs onto n PMs after dynamic VM
placement
δαp−1 A strategy α for PMp−1
ϑ 3-dimensional matrix (n X n X V) showing the live migra-
tions to be executed. Thus, ϑikj = 1 means that VM ′js
migration from PMi to PMk is needed.
S Strategy Matrix to store the collection of strategies for all
the PMs. Thus Sij means the jth strategy for the ith PM.
payoffi(δ
α
i ) Total Energy Consumption if strategy α of PMi is taken.
Algorithm 1 is the calling module. Is takes the initial mapping of V virtual machines
onto n physical machines as input and produces the best strategy or the optimal mapping
with minimum energy consumption as the output. Also the the migrations needed to reach
to the optimal solution is given as output.
The algorithm uses the congestion game model which models a resource set being
shared by a group of players. Here every player selects a subset of resources from the
resource set in order to maximize his own payoff; here maximizing the payoff means
minimizing the energy consumption. Here, the physical machines are treated as players
which select a subset of VMs in order to minimize the total consumption of energy. Thus
algorithm 1 calls algorithm 2 for each player in order to reach Equilibrium at every step.
Every player, that is each Physical machine acts as a player and attempts to achieve
its own equilibrium by going through algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 finds the best strategy for the ith PM. It takes as input the best strategy
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Algorithm 1: Equilibrium for n players
Input: n Physical Machines, V Virtual Machines
Initial mapping for n players; ρn = (ρn0 , ρ
n
1 , . . . . . . , ρ
n
n−1)
Result: Best strategy for n players; δn = (δn0 , δn1 , . . . . . . , δnn−1)
Executable live migrations matrix; ϑ
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) do
Nash Equilibrium(i);
Algorithm 2: Nash Equilibrium(p)
Input: Best strategy for (p-1) Physical Machines
; δp−1 = (δp−10 , δ
p−1
1 , . . . . . . , δ
p−1
p−2)
Output: Best strategy for p players; δp = (δp0 , δ
p
1, . . . . . . , δ
p
p−1)
∃δαp−1 ∈ S(p−1)j ,
payoffp−1(δαp−1) ≤ payoffp−1(δp−1) ; ∀δp−1 ∈ S(p−1)j
δpp−1 ← δαp−1
δpi ← δp−1i , i ∈ [0, p− 2]
δp = (δp0 , δ
p
1, . . . . . . , δ
p
p−2 , δ
p
p−1)
j = 0 ;
for (i = 0; i < (p− 1); i = j) do
if (payoffi(δpi ) ≤ payoffi(δi) ; ∀δi ∈ Sij) then
j++;
else
∃δαi ∈ Sij ,
payoffi(δ
α
i ) ≤ payoffi(δi) ; ∀δi ∈ Sij
δpi ← δαi
j = 0 ;
for (i-1) PMs and gives as output the best strategy of i PMs. First the ith PM looks for the
best strategy which will consume the least energy. Then all the (i− 1) PMs change their
strategies accordingly so that equilibrium is maintained, that is optimal energy consump-
tion takes place. This algorithm thus produces the best strategy for every step for all the
n physical machines.
There are n players (Physical Machines) and V virtual machines. So in each step
in order to achieve Nash Equilibrium for a player the time complexity will be O(nV ).
The algorithm for finding out the equilibrium for a particular step has to be repeated for
n players. Thus the time complexity to achieve Nash Equilibrium for n players will be
O(n2V ). Thus this algorithm obtains the Nash Equilibrium in cooperative congestion
game for dynamic VM placement at a particular time frame in polynomial time.
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3.8 Simulation and Results
In this section, simulation parameters are defined and experimental results are discussed to
evaluate the performance of Algorithm 1 and 2, which aim to optimally provide solutions
tot he dynamic VM placement problem. The simulation has been conducted using an
in-house simulation using JAVA on a desktop computer with Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-3770
processor, 3.4 GHz and 4 GB memory.
3.8.1 Energy Consumption Model
The parameters’ values for the energy consumption model which is proposed in this chap-
ter are given below (45).
The values of xi and yi are determined via function fitting graph related to CPU uti-
lization and are fixed at 61.06 and 2 respectively. Thus Equation 2.4.6 which calculates
the consumption of energy by PMs in different states can be written as :
ECi(t) = FEi(PMSi) × t + 61.06 × Li(t)2 (3.8.1)
It is considered in the experiments that all the PMs are homogeneous in nature. Thus
the parameters’ values are same for all the PMs.
Table 3.3: Values for The Energy Consumption Parameters
States Running Ready Idle Off
Running FEi(running) = 32.2708 - - -
Ready - FEi(ready) = 32.2708 ECSi3 = 3.5 -
Idle - ECSi2 = 7.5 FEi(idle) = 0.5 ECSi4 = 5.5
Off - ECSi1 = 0 - FEi(off) = 0
Table 3.3 gives us the values for the parameter ECS and FE which are used to mea-
sure the PM’s energy consumption of state switching.
To determine the energy consumption during live VM migration, the parameters have
their values fixed; αi = 0.256, βi = 10.0825, αk = 0.256, βk = 10.0825 and γik = 0.5.
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3.8.2 Experimental Results
Six sets of experiments are performed and the results are compared with results of Best
Fit algorithm. Best Fit Algorithm is a centralized algorithm which aims to place VMs into
the PM with the least available space and with no SLA violations, such that the PMs are
fully utilized. The steps involved in best fit procedure are defined in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Best Fit
Input: p Physical Machines, n Virtual Machines
Result: Best Fit placement strategy for n Virtual Machines
for (i = 0; i < n; i = i+ 1) do
Sort p PMs in increasing order of free space (remaining capacity)
for (j = 0; j < p; j = j + 1) do
if (Requirement(VMi) ≤ Capacity(PMj) then
Place VMi into PMj
break;
First three experiments are conducted by keeping the number of PMs fixed at 40.
The number of VM requests are varied from 10 to 150 and results obtained from best fit
algorithm (centralized approach) and cooperative game theoretic process (decentralized
approach) are compared.
Figure 3.4 shows the results of number of PMs used against number of VMs, keeping
the number of available PMs fixed at 40. It is seen that for lower number of VMs, the
number of PMs used is similar for both best fit and cooperative game theoretic approach.
But as the number of VMs increases, there is a marked difference between the results of
two approaches. Cooperative game theoretic algorithm optimizes the placement strategy
and uses lesser number of PMs for the placement of VMs onto PMs. For large number of
VMs, the best fit strategy uses all the PMs for the placement.
The result for energy consumption vs no. of VMs for a fixed number of available VMs
at 40 is shown in Figure 3.5. For large number of VMs, there is a great dissimilarity in the
consumption of energy between the placement strategies by best fit and game theoretic
approach. The lower energy consumption is due to the fact shown in Fig. 3.4 that lesser
number of PMs are used for dynamic placement by cooperative game theoretic approach
than the best fit procedure. Thus, there is a greater save in energy due to the change in the
states of PMs from running to idle.
The results of execution time vs no. of VMs are shown in Fig. 3.6. It is seen that for
lesser number of VMs, cooperative game theoretic approach takes lesser time to execute
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Figure 3.4: No. of PMs Used vs No. of VMs (Available PMs Fixed at 40)
Figure 3.5: Energy Consumption vs No. of VMs (Available PMs Fixed at 40)
than the best fit approach. But as the number of VMs increases, the execution time for the
best fit approach becomes lesser. This is due to the fact that the game theoretic approach
follows a two-tier optimization strategy; that is first the player chooses the best strategy
and then other players selects their strategies optimally and this process continues for all
the players which leads to Nash Equilibrium.
The second set of simlations are run considering the fact that number of VMs are fixed
at 100 and number of PMs varies from 35-95 in intervals of 15. The lowest number of
PMs is taken as 35 since after many tests, it was seen that to place 100 VMs in best fit
approach, optimally 35 PMs were at least needed.
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Figure 3.6: Execution Time vs No. of VMs (Available PMs Fixed at 40)
Figure 3.7 shows the experimental results of number of PMs used vs the number
of available PMs. It is clearly seen that for all the values, cooperative game theoretic
approach yields better results than best fit approach.
Figure 3.7: No. of PMs used vs No. of Available PMs (VMs Fixed at 100)
The results for energy consumption against number of available PMs are shown in
Figure 3.8. Since energy consumption is directly related to the number of PMs used,
that is the more the number of PMs in running state, greater is the energy consumption.
Since it is seen from fig. 3.7 that game theoretic approach uses lesser number of PMs
than the centralized approach to place the VMs, the energy consumption reduces in the
decentralized approach.
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Figure 3.8: Energy Consumption vs No. of Available PMs (VMs Fixed at 100)
The variation of execution time against an increasing number of available PMs is
shown in Figure 3.9. Game theoretic approach takes slightly more time for giving the op-
timal placement strategy for dynamically placing VMs onto PMs, though this fact can be
overlooked because the decentralized approach gives a much lesser energy consumption
model compared to the best fit approach solution.
Figure 3.9: Execution Time vs No. of Available PMs (VMs Fixed at 100)
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3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, a novel decentralized procedure to dynamic VM placement problem is
given using cooperative congestion game theory. It is shown that the game theoretic ap-
proach gives an optimal solution which reaches Nash Equilibrium in polynomial time.
The experimental results and the comparisons with centralized approach (best fit algo-
rithm) clearly shows that energy consumption is reduced in game theoretic approach.
This overshadows the fact that the execution time is slightly greater in the decentralized
model than in the best fit solution.
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CHAPTER 4
NON COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY FOR DYNAMIC
VM PLACEMENT
4.1 Introduction
In recent times, there has been a growth in the number of cloud users. Thus more number
of physical machines are needed in order to process the user requests, which leads to
greater energy consumption. As seen in the previous chapter, optimal placement of virtual
machines over physical machines is an effective method to minimize the consumption of
energy. This goal is not easy to achieve when there is no centralized approach towards
decision making and all the decision makers are allowed to act selfishly.
In this chapter, non-cooperative approach of game theory is used to arrive at a solution
for dynamic virtual machine placement problem. Every decision maker tries to minimize
its own energy consumption independently and eventually all of them reach the Nash
equilibrium. When the system attains Nash equilibrium, no decision maker can benefit
further by altering its own strategy. Thus the main goal of this chapter is to minimize
energy consumption in a decentralized cloud computing model by using non-cooperative
game theory.
4.2 Literature Survey for Non Cooperative Game Theory
Teng et al. in 2010 introduced a novel Bayesian Nash Equilibrium allocation algorithm
in order to find solution to the resource management problem in cloud computing (38).
It analyzes the bid proportion model where users are assigned resources in proportion to
their bids. The allocation solutions reach Nash equilibrium by gambling in stages which
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is further simplified by considering that competition among users is for the same job type
consisting a sequential order of same type of jobs. In this model, the shortcoming is that
bidders fix the resource price and problems of response delay are not not addressed. In
the same year, Sun et al. in (36) used continuous double auction and Nash equilibrium
for the allocation of resources in cloud based on the M/M/1 queueing system. Sun et al.
took performance QOS and economic QOS as optimization objectives. The work in (36)
greatly improves the Quality of Service in terms of performance and economy. It is fair
to both resources and users by considering execution cost of ’pay per use’ services and
the average time of execution of user jobs.
The problem of service provisioning was studied by Ardagna et al. in (3). IaaS
providers host applications of Saas providers such that every SaaS complies with the SLA
(revenue and penalty) requirements. SaaS providers maximize revenues while cost of re-
sources by IaaS is minimized. IaaS providers maximize revenue by providing virtualized
resources.The following assumptions for SaaS providers are taken in this work.
• A single web service application is hosted on a single VM.
• Same web service application implemented by many VMs can run in parallel.
• All the virtual machines are uniform in terms of CPU and RAM capacity.
IaaS providers offer flat VMs, on-demand VMs and on-spot VMs for which SaaS providers
pay. The service provisioning problem is formulated and solved using game theory. The
main drawbacks in this work are listed as follows.
• Validation of the solution is missing by experiments in real world environment.
• The heuristic solutions adopted by IaaS and SaaS providers are not compared.
These drawbacks in 2011 are worked upon by Ardagna et al. and presented in 2013 (4).
Kong et al. (26) worked upon resource allocation among selfish virtual machines
by applying stochastic approximation methods. It thwarted non-cooperative behavior of
the VMs. The proposed approach is not implemented in a real world virtualized cloud
system. A cooperative game theoretic resource splitting solution in cloud computing was
formulated by Lu et al. in 2012 (30). Here multiple cloud providers cooperate with one
another in order to form a cloud federation which ensures greater profit since provider’s
capability to serve for public cloud users is enhanced. A game theoretic policy is formed
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to aid SPs in the decision making process. The work’s performance is not gauged for
many cloud environments.
The co-scheduling problem addressed by Dhillon et al. in (10) involves a central au-
thority which provides solution to constrained optimization problem with an objective
function. This works provides an alternate game theoretic perspective using stable match-
ings theory which reduces the Stable Roommates Problem (SRP) to Stable Marriages
Problem (SMP). Chen et al. in (9) studied the use of game theory for live migration pre-
diction over cloud computing. It is shown that game theory improves Gilbert-Elliot model
for the prediction of the probability on dirty page.
4.3 Observations
Table 4.1: Non Cooperative Game Theory in Distributed Resource Management
Researcher Game Environment Work
2010
Kołodziej et
al. (24)
Non-
cooperative
Grid Combines non-cooperative game theo-
retic and genetic based meta heuristics
to achieve secure task allocation to ma-
chines in computational grids.
Teng et al.
(38)
Non-
cooperative
Cloud A new Bayesian Nash Equilibrium allo-
cation algorithm is introduced heteroge-
neous distribution of resources in cloud
computing. It analyzes the bid proportion
model.
Sun et al. (36) Non-
cooperative
Cloud Uses Nash equilibrium and continuous
double auction for allocation of resources
in cloud based on M/M/1 queueing sys-
tem with the objectives for optimization
as economic QOS and performance QOS.
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2011
Ardagna et al.
(3)
Non-
cooperative
Cloud Provides an efficient algorithm for the
generalized Nash game model to allocate
and manage IaaS resources to SaaS com-
ponents during run time.
Kołodziej et
al. (25)
Non-
cooperative
Grid Presents symmetric non-zero game and
asymmetric Stackelberg game as non-
cooperative game approaches in order to
model the requirements of grid users on
resource and task allocation.
Kong et al.
(26)
Non-
cooperative
Cloud Applies stochastic approximation meth-
ods to obtain the stochastic solution of re-
source allocation problem among selfish
virtual machines.
2012
Buscemi et al.
(7)
Non-
cooperative
Grid Propose a non-cooperative grid job
scheduling game with the grid sites act-
ing as players and the strategies to be
the scheduling algorithms. It focuses on
global scheduling.
2013
Ardagna et al.
(4)
Non-
cooperative
Cloud Service provisioning problem is modeled
as a generalized Nash game. Two meth-
ods based on best-reply dynamics are pre-
sented and their solutions approach Nash
equilibrium. It is simulated on real pro-
totype environment deployed on Amazon
EC2.
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Dhillon et al.
(10)
Non-
cooperative
Cloud The problem of VM co-scheduling which
decreases the performance of virtual ma-
chines is provided with a game theo-
retic perspective by using stable match-
ings theory.
4.4 Problem Formulation
The system model that is used in this chapter is the same as that used in the previous
chapter. The model is shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Proposed System Model
The major difference between the models in these two chapters is that the physical
machines which act as players for the game are non-cooperative here. This means that
the physical machines acting as players, will act selfishly and try to minimize its own
energy consumption independently. This non-cooperative model has to be solved using
non-cooperative game theoretic approach.
In order to arrive at an optimal decision, the decision making process takes help from
the VM Monitor and the Service Request Monitor to get information about the resource
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availability and available workload on all physical machines. All physical machines have
a PM Controller which act as players for the non-cooperative decision making procedure.
4.4.1 Problem Statement
The dynamic VM placement problem is to be solved with the objective as to minimize
energy consumption. In this chapter non-cooperative game theory is used in order to
solve the problem since the physical machines acting as players take their own decisions
selfishly. Every PMi has Vi number of VMs which have to optimally placed. In order to
form the problem statement, the following arrays are used.
• PMS (1 X P) - This is used in order to save the present state of the physical machine.
Here, 4 states have been considered for every physical machine; 1 = off, 2 = idle, 3
= ready and 4 = running. There are a total of P physical machines.
• PMR (3 X P) - The array is used to specify the amount of resources every PM has.
Here, 3 resources are considered; memory, processor speed and number of cores.
• VMR (3 X V) - Let V be the total number of VMs in the system; that is combining
all PMs. The array is used to indicate the requirements of memory, processor speed
and number of cores for each VM.
• VMP (I X V) - It is considered that in the SLA, I number of performance indicators
are mentioned. Then, VMP is used to store the requirement of the performance
indicators for all the VMs.
• M (P X V) - This array is used to store the mapping of PMs to VMs. Thus Mij
should be 1 if VMj is placed in PMi, else 0.
• MP (I X V) - In order to store the performance of all the VMs, this array is used.
Thus arrays VMP and MP are used to see if the service level agreement is fol-
lowed or not.
• ECS (P X 4) - The energy consumption during switching of states is stored here. For
PMi, ECSi1 specifies the energy consumption during switching from off state to
ready state; ECSi2, ECSi3, ECSi4 for state switching from idle to ready, ready
to idle and idle to off respectively. It is considered that there is negligible energy
consumption during state transition form running to ready.
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• VMLM (P X P X V) - This array is used to store the live VM migrations from one
PM to another PM.
The energy consumption model is described in chapter 2. The problem statement
of dynamic VM placement to minimize energy consumption (VMDPPEC) using non-
cooperative game theory can be stated as follows:
VMDPPEC = min TEC(M) (4.4.1)
where,
TEC(M) = EPS(M) + EVM(M) + EPM(M) (4.4.2)
such that,
Cri ≤ PMRri
(Cri = VMR × M ′ ; r = 1, 2, . . . ., R ; i = 1, 2, . . . ., P )
(4.4.3)
P∑
i=1
Mij = 1 (j = 1, 2, . . . . ., V ) (4.4.4)
MPiv ≥ VMPiv (i = 1, 2, . . . . , I; v = 1, 2, . . . .. , V ) (4.4.5)
Equation 4.4.1 shows the optimization objective of the VM dynamic placement prob-
lem, i.e. minimization of energy consumption (EC) for a particular placement solution
(M) which has to be solved using non-cooperative game theory.
EPS(M) is the total energy consumption by state switching of PMs for a particular
solution M .
EVM(M) calculates the total consumption of energy during live VM migrations for
the solution M .
EPM(M) gives the result of the total energy consumption of all the PMs in their
current states for the solution M .
The solution is arrived upon satisfying all the three constraints as shown in equations
4.4.3, 4.4.4 and 4.4.5. Equation 4.4.3 is the capacity constraint, Placement constraint
is represented in Equation 4.4.4 and Equation 4.4.5 shows that there should be no SLA
violations.
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4.5 Optimization Algorithm for Non-Cooperative Dynamic
VM Placement
In this section, the algorithm based on non-cooperative theory which has been used to
solve the problem of dynamic virtual machine placement has been discussed. The sym-
bols used in the algorithm have been listed in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: List of symbols and their meanings
Symbols Meanings
i Physical machine number
itr Iteration number
energy
(itr)
i Total energy of i
th PM computed at iteration number itr
τ The accepted tolerance
δαp−1 A strategy α for PMp−1
en Tolerance at iteration number itr.
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣energy(itr−1)i − energy(itr)i ∣∣∣
command The instruction given to the neighbor PM. It has two values,
CEASE and CARRY ON .
SEND((a, itr, command), i) Send message (a, itr, command) to PMi
RECEIV E((a, itr, command), i) Receive message (a, itr, command) from PMi
VMLM TEMP Temporary live VM migration matrix.
M TEMP Temporary VM placement matrix.
Algorithm 4 shows the procedure for a PM to select its best placement every time
such that in every iteration the energy consumption by that physical machine is lesser
than the energy consumption in the previous iteration for that particular PM. Thus, all the
PMs act selfishly in order to optimally dynamically place VMs onto PMs such that energy
consumption is minimized.
Algorithm 4: Best Placement(i)
Input: VMLM TEMP, M TEMP, itr
Output: energyitri
while (1) do
Find new placement strategy for PMi;
Calculate energyitri
if (energyitri ≤ energyitr−1i ) then
Update M TEMP, VMLM TEMP;
return(energyitri );
Practically speaking, in order to compute Nash Equilibrium, some coordination must
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be present among the players; in this case the physical machines. Thus, the non-cooperative
procedure shown in algorithm 5 is devised where players (PMs) are synchronized in such
a manner that their individual placement strategies are updated in a round-robin fashion.
Algorithm 5: Non-Cooperative Algorithm
PM i; (i=1, 2, . . . ., n) executes:
1. Initial :
itr← 0;
energyitri ← 0;
en← 1;
sum energy← 0;
command← CARRY ON ;
prev = [(i-2) mod n] + 1;
next = [i mod n] + 1;
2. while (1) do
if (i = 1) // First PM then
prev = n;
if (itr 6= 0) then
RECEIVE((en, itr, command), prev);
if (en ≤ τ ) then
SEND((en, itr, CEASE), next);
exit;
sum energy← 0;
itr← itr + 1;
else
// Other PMs
RECEIVE((sum energy, itr, command), prev);
if (command = CEASE) then
if (i 6= n) then
SEND((sum energy, itr, CEASE), next);
exit;
energyitri = Best Placement(VMLM TEMP, M TEMP, itr);
sum energy = sum energy +
∣∣∣energy(itr−1)i − energy(itr)i ∣∣∣;
SEND ((sum energy, itr, CARRY ON), next);
Algorithm 5 is executed for all the physical machines periodically or whenever SLA
violations are made. When the execution of the algorithm is over, the players will have
reached Nash Equilibrium, thus the strategies remain the same in equilibrium.
In this algorithm, the tolerance is maintained at a very small value, such that in every
iteration the energy consumption is reduced till a point that very small savings in energy
is seen in consecutive iterations. This is the point where the algorithm exits. In order
to facilitate the coordination among all the physical machines, messages are sent to the
next physical machine. The message consists of three arguments; the energy savings
made in that particular iteration, the iteration number and the command. If the command
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is CARRY ON , it means that equilibrium has not been reached and best placement
strategy needs to be computed again. On the other hand, the command CEASE instructs
the next physical machine that it can exit the algorithm as equilibrium is reached. In every
iteration, the first PM checks the tolerance for the last iteration and accordingly initiates
the command sequence for all the PMs.
4.6 Simulation and Results
The simulation has been done using an in house simulation using Java. The simulation
parameters and the results are given in the next sections.
4.6.1 Simulation Parameters
The series of experiments have been performed considering the capacities of physical
machines as each having 12.8 GHz of processor speed, 8 GB memory and is octa-cored.
The capacities of VMs are chosen randomly from a fixed set of values.
In order to calculate the consumption of energy by every PM, we use the energy con-
sumption model described in chapter 2. The values for the parameters are shown in Table
4.3. To determine the energy consumption during live VM migration, the parameters have
their values fixed; αi = 0.256, βi = 10.0825, αk = 0.256, βk = 10.0825 and γik = 0.5.
Table 4.3: Values for The Energy Consumption Parameters
States Running Ready Idle Off
Running FEi(running) = 32.2708 - - -
Ready - FEi(ready) = 32.2708 ECSi3 = 3.5 -
Idle - ECSi2 = 7.5 FEi(idle) = 0.5 ECSi4 = 5.5
Off - ECSi1 = 0 - FEi(off) = 0
The Convergence of Nash Equilibrium
In order to prove that the non-cooperative algorithm converges to the nash equilibrium,
we have performed experiments; the results of which is shown in Figure 4.2 and Table
4.4. A system of 20 PMs and 50 VMs is considered.
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Figure 4.2: en vs No. of Iterations
Table 4.4: sum energy (en) vs No. of Iterations (for 20 PMs, 50 VMs)
sum energy (en) No. of Iterations
10.09 10
2.84 20
0.76 30
0.043 40
0.0027 50
It is observed that the value of en converges to zero as the number of iterations in-
creases. This proves that we are achieving Nash Equilibrium in polynomial time. From
this experiment, for further simulations, we fix the value of τ as 0.003.
4.6.2 Experimental Results
Figure 4.3 shows the variation of the number of iterations needed to achieve a value for
sum energy less than τ (0.003) as the number of PMs increases. For this simulation, the
number of VMs has been fixed at 50.
Next, we perform a set of experiments keeping the number of PMs available fixed at
40 and increasing the number of VMs from 10 to 150. All the results obtained from the
non-cooperative game theoretic algorithm are compared with the results obtained from
cooperative game theoretic algorithm and best fit algorithm. The impact of selfishness is
seen in the results.
The number of PMs used in order to dynamically place the VMs are projected in
54
Chapter 4 : Non Cooperative Game Theory for Dynamic VM Placement
Figure 4.3: Convergence of Non-Cooperative Algorithm (until en ≤ 0.003)
Figure 4.4: No. of PMs Used vs No. of VMs (Available PMs Fixed at 40)
Figure 4.4. The results showing the energy consumption and execution time are shown in
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 respectively.
From the results, it is observed that number of PMs used and the energy consumption
for the non-cooperative game theoretic algorithm are similar to the results obtained from
the cooperative game theoretic approach. Both these algorithms give better results than
the best fit approach. But due to the non-cooperative nature of the players, that is PMs,
the execution time increases for the non-cooperative approach. But the increase in exe-
cution time is not drastic so as to discard the algorithm. For minimization of the energy
consumption, a slight increase in the execution time can be afforded.
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Figure 4.5: Energy Consumption vs No. of VMs (Available PMs Fixed at 40)
Figure 4.6: Execution Time vs No. of VMs (Available PMs Fixed at 40)
Figure 4.7: No. of PMs used vs No. of Available PMs (VMs Fixed at 100)
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Figure 4.8: Energy Consumption vs No. of Available PMs (VMs Fixed at 100)
The next set of experiments are performed for a number of VMs fixed at 100 while
the number of available PMs are increased from 35 to 95 in equal intervals of 15. The
results of the non-cooperative approach along with the comparison with the cooperative
procedure and the best fit algorithm are shown in Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9.
Here too, the results obtained from the non-cooperative algorithm are similar to the
results of cooperative approach which are better than the best fit procedure’s results. But
the minimization of energy consumption via non-cooperative approach comes at a cost of
increased execution time.
Thus the impact of the non-cooperative nature of physical machines affects the exe-
cution time to achieve optimal placement of VMs onto PMs while minimizing the energy
consumption.
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Figure 4.9: Execution Time vs No. of Available PMs (VMs Fixed at 100)
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, it is considered that the physical machines do not cooperate with each
other in the decision making process for dynamic virtual machine placement. Thus,
non-cooperative game theoretic approach is used to find solution to the dynamic virtual
machine placement problem. From the experimental results, it can be deduced that the
impact of selfishness increases the execution time but the energy consumption minimiza-
tion is similar to the cooperative game theoretic approach. Also the convergence of Nash
equilibrium is shown.
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis work, the problem of dynamic virtual machine placement has been ad-
dressed. After a deep analysis of the already existing research work in this area, a de-
centralized approach using game theory has been proposed here in order to optimize the
consumption of energy. First, an energy consumption model is built in view of the com-
plicated process of dynamic placement of virtual machines. Here, three factors have been
considered while building the model, namely energy consumption of physical machines
in different states, consumption of energy during the state transition of physical machines
and during live virtual machine migrations. In this work, both cooperative and selfish
nature of physical machines have been considered. Cooperative game theory using the
concept of congestion game and non-cooperative game theoretic approaches have been
used to propose new algorithms to optimally place virtual machines onto physical ma-
chines dynamically. For both the approaches, it is seen that Nash equilibrium is achieved
in polynomial time. Both the algorithms guarantee a list of live virtual machine migra-
tions to achieve the target solution from the initial mapping. Simulations are done and
the experimental results are compared with the best fit approach. Both cooperative and
non-cooperative algorithms help in minimizing the energy consumption, though the non-
cooperative game theoretic approach takes a longer execution time to give the optimal
result.
While conducting the simulations, fixed values are taken for calculating the energy
consumption of physical machines. Also it is assumed that all the physical machines are
homogeneous in nature. For further research, the values of the parameters for calculation
of energy consumption, should be computed dynamically. Also heterogeneous environ-
ment should be considered. In addition to these, energy consumption due to other factors
like cooling equipment which have not been considered in this work should be taken into
account in future.
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